For Dewey Culture is that which organizes a physical environment to enable the growth of the human organisms within while simultaneously providing the means whereby the human organism is organized into a person. That is, culture is the primary influence upon the materials of human nature, the human organism, such that the result of the transaction between the human organism and its environment is recognized as a member of that society through their specific patterns of behavior. It is these patterns of behavior that ultimately enable the human organism reorganized into a person to be recognized as a member of a society. As these patterns of behavior are established not just in transaction with an environment, but by means of the environment, the development of persons as members of a culture is accomplished through culture as an environment.[[1]](#footnote-1) It is through the transformation of humans into members of a society through the organization of their impulsions by cultural customs that culture is perpetuated and conserved.[[2]](#footnote-2) These ways of behaving, or habits allow, for the denotation of the activities of a social group and, insofar as those activities are taken up by the individuals in transaction with the environment, the individual can be recognized as a member of the social group defined by those behaviors.[[3]](#footnote-3)

It is for this reason that, for Dewey, different cultures, different individuals, can be told apart. For Dewey, it is the different ways of behaving supplied by culture, when integrated together, which serve to give rise to the sense of anything “individual” in the personal sense.[[4]](#footnote-4) Accordingly, how these ways of behaving supplied by culture modify one another in their transaction with one another is what results in the attribution of culture as a personal property.[[5]](#footnote-5) Dewey offers the example of America to demonstrate this point. If, as Dewey suggests, American culture is largely oriented towards acquiring profit, it is not because human nature has an initially profit motivated orientation; it is due to the transaction of the human organism with the American cultural environment that serves to organize the elements of human nature, whatever they may be, into one that possesses an avaricious nature as a personal property. Thus, for Dewey, “The problem is to find out the way in which the elements of a culture interact with each other and the way in which the elements of human nature are caused to interact with one another under conditions set by their interaction with the existing environment,”[[6]](#footnote-6) to give rise to the specific kinds of persons within a given culture.

Dewey uses transaction to indicate the interdependent nature of existences such that they are always engaged in a process of co-construction through their mutual engagement with one another. Dewey makes this clear in the context of the environment when he states, “The first great consideration is that life goes on in an environment; not merely in it but because of it, through interaction with it.”[[7]](#footnote-7) While Dewey does use “interaction,” we should bear in mind that transaction replaces interaction in Dewey’s thought and involves the transformation of both organism and environment. As a result, we can understand Dewey to be stating that life goes on through transaction with the environment, by means of how the transaction between organism and environment entails mutual modification. That is, for Dewey, an organism survives by using its organs, its embodiment, as the means of transaction with the environment such that it can satisfy its biological needs. This outreach to the environment in response to a need result in an expanded understanding of transaction which encompasses a back-and-forth movement between satisfaction, or stability, and precarity or lack. In short, transaction results in organisms that are not static, self-contained ontological wholes. Instead, the organism is a dynamic manifold in constant adjustment with and through its environment. As a dynamic manifold, the organism is neither separate from nor totally identical with its environment. Instead, the organism and the environment constitute one another in an ongoing process of growth and development.

Culture also transforms the physical activities of the human organism as, for Dewey, “Animal activities, such as eating and drinking, searching for food, copulation, etc., acquire new properties. Eating food becomes a group festival and celebration; procuring food, the art of agriculture and exchange; copulation passes into the institution of the family.”[[8]](#footnote-8) However, these transformations do not always result in the same kinds of properties as the meanings of the object vary due to the varieties of modes of transacting with the environment and the varieties of environments the human organism and the culture it is part of transacts with. To this end, different cuisines, religious celebrations, familial structures all emerge from the transformation of the physical environment and the biological activities of the members of society. More presently, it is under the pressure of socio-cultural influences that persons come to be understood as persons.[[9]](#footnote-9)

Here, Dewey uses the example of parenthood as the prototype for this transformation. While parenthood, in the biological sense of producing offspring, might be the consequences of reproduction, under the pressures of culture, the provision of resources by men and the nurturing of children by women becomes a moral responsibility by virtue of the biological functions of the parents. Accordingly, the biological need for protection, nurturing, and support for growth necessary to ensure the survival of children becomes a right to such things under the pressures of culture.To this end, “this change from the biological to the distinctively human and moral takes place not just under social conditions but because of influences, pressures, and commendations (approvals) occurring in group and communal life,”[[10]](#footnote-10) thereby inverting what Dewey understand the actual order should be. Instead of persons being assigned moral responsibility for specific functions transformed under culture, and thus having moral worth by virtue of how they fulfill these offices, persons should have moral worth for their intrinsic nature as person.

What, then, does this transactional model of culture have to do with disability? The above provides the ground for considering disability as emerging through transaction with culture by means of biological differences. In keeping with the above, we can restate the problem of culture as trying to find out the ways that elements of a culture transact with one another and how the elements of human nature transact with one another under the conditions determined the cultural environment. In the context of disability, the problem of disability is to determine how the elements of culture transact and how the elements of human nature transact under conditions set by the cultural environment to give rise to disability as a way of being in the world through culture. To be clear, this is not to ignore the biology of disability, rather; it is to point to disability as emerging through the transactions between the body and the cultural environment. Put another way, the question of disability, like the question of culture, “is to be solved by reference to facts of action,”[[11]](#footnote-11) that is, facts of transaction within a cultural environment, and the ways that environment enables or impedes action. More specifically, we must turn to the ways in which the categories of disability and ability emerge as ways of transacting through culture.

Interlude: What About the Medical and Social Models

For Dewey, culture is comprised of two interdependent elements, generally referred to as the “material” and “non-material” or “ideal” elements. For Dewey, the “material elements” of culture are comprised of what Dewey calls “artifacts.” For Dewey, “Artifacts include habitations, temples and their rituals, weapons, paraphernalia, tools, implements, means of transportation, roads, clothing, decorations and ornamentations, etc., etc. They, together with the technical processes involved in their use, constitute the ‘material aspect of culture.’”[[12]](#footnote-12) Of note, Dewey also includes the ways that artifacts are used, the habits that structure their use, within the material aspect of culture which, as a mode of language, enables the transmission of culture. To be clear, how the artifact is used is also implied in Dewey’s inclusion of “temples and their rituals” in the material aspects of culture. Thus, we may also include the kinds of habits that are performed within habitations, the rituals, and habitual practices within schools, and so on. As with the transformation of the biological into the personal and the natural into the cultural, it is the transaction of the material with the non-material which enables culture to unite the totality of human experience into a unified form.

 While it might be simple enough to reduce the material elements of culture to merely material, Dewey’s inclusion of the rituals performed within temples and the technical processes used to create the material elements of culture is valuable for understanding how Dewey’s thesis of culture applies to the models of disability. Briefly, what we call the social model of disability is concerned with what Dewey refers to as the material elements of culture. Insofar as the social model of disability treats disability as the result of the organization of society through environments, attitudes, and social structures, rather than merely a consequence of biological differences or impairments, the social model focuses on resolving the structural inequalities that result in the organization of disabled persons as an oppressed group, rather than as individuals whose biology needs repair (Shakespeare, 2006). As a result, the social model locates the locus of intervention at the social or policy level, rather than at the medical or biological level. Rather than “fix” the person, it is the society in which the person is anchored that needs “repair” or reorganization. Thus, the social model argues for coalition building, advocacy for equal rights, and political organization as tools whereby disabled persons can live fuller, more satisfying lives through the transformation of society.

 The social model is concerned with the material aspects of culture through its aim to modify both the physical environment, the technical processes that organizes it, and the “rituals” which take place within the physical environment. Here, we should not treat “ritual” and “temple” as solely referring to religious rituals, or religious temples: what Dewey has in mind are all those practices, habits, and formalized arts that enable human beings to live lives of enriched meaning. To this end, “temples” would also include educational institutions and the practices of education that go on within them; social and economic institutions and the practices of business that go on within them, and; all those “temples” required to maintain the other material aspects of culture. Still further, that the material aspect of culture also includes transportation, clothing, roads, decorations, allows the concern of the social model with the broader social determinants of disability, including the organization of fashion, sexual desirability, and the values communicated by the material aspect of culture as organized around the assumption of an able-bodied or neurotypical person to be captured as a concern with the material aspect of culture insofar as the material extends beyond the physical and into how the physical is used.

 In contrast, what has been referred to as the “non-material” elements of culture is best articulated by Dewey as the “ideal” elements of culture which encompasses the moral, scientific, aesthetic, and political belief structures which subsequently determine the use of the material elements of culture.[[13]](#footnote-13) The ideal elements of culture are also those that determine the appropriate use and organization of the materials of human nature into persons and members of a culture. Beyond that, the ideal elements of culture are those elements of culture which assign the responsibility for the exercise of the duties towards their social and cultural group. Thus, how a person comes to be recognized as a person is more than a matter of being born into a culture, it is a matter of learning the cultural roles we can take through the ways that culture in its ideal form transacts with the materiality of the human organism and the ways that the resulting person further transacts with other individuals within the social environment.[[14]](#footnote-14) Personhood, and the identities that qualifies it, is therefore a social achievement accomplished by means of a cultural environment.

 Here, we might slot the medical model of disability into Dewey’s “material aspect” of culture insofar as Under a medical model of disability, disability emerges as a deviation from “normal” human functioning which negatively impacts the life outcomes of the person diagnosed as disabled. On this view, disabled persons suffer from biological abnormalities or dysfunctions in need of treatment or assessment governed by medical or scientific institutions. As the result of impairments of objective biological features, disability is treated as inherent or intrinsic to the disabled person, rather than as shaped by social, cultural, or political forces that structure how disability is understood. Further, as an abnormality in “normal” functioning, the medical model demands a medical resolution to the abnormality that brings it in line with, or approximates, the functions of non-disabled persons.

 In a Deweyan sense, the medical model relies upon scientific belief structures to assess and provide an “objective” determinant of “normal” human functioning which then is used to make moral pronunciations about the kinds of lives, the kinds of transactions, that the medically diagnosed individual can engage in within the world. As part of the ideal elements of culture, the medical model lays the ground for the kinds of responsibilities disabled persons can adopt by virtue of determining the kinds of transactions possible for disabled persons in advance of their transaction with the world. Put another way, as part of the ideal element of culture, the medical model determines the kinds of cultural roles that a disabled person can take on the basis of how it enables the organization of the disabled person within culture. Persons with disabilities who exceed the limited expectations, or duties, assigned to them by virtue of the ways in which the medical model is also a moral model are often deemed exceptional “supercrips,” and are ideals towards which a disabled person should aspire. The Deweyan view of the medical model as part of the ideal elements of culture deviates from predominant understandings of the medical model by recognizing that the medical model is not simply a scientific view, but a moral view that animates certain responsibilities towards the group.

 To conclude this point, for Dewey, “that ‘culture’ includes the material and the ideal in their reciprocal interrelationships,”[[15]](#footnote-15) means that neither the social model of disability nor the medical model of disability can be held strictly apart. For Dewey, understanding the medical and social models as in transaction with one another is to understand that it is the environment organized through these interrelations that serves to engage the human organism in transactions that “forms the mental and emotional disposition of behavior in individuals by engaging them in activities that arouse and strengthen certain impulses, that have certain purposes and entail certain consequences.”[[16]](#footnote-16) Put simply, it is the interaction between the ideal elements of culture and the material elements of culture as abstracted into the social and medical models that give rise to the production of disabled persons through continuity with the cultural environment such that specific kinds of individuals are formed through transaction with the social environment, and who bear the stamp of the cultural environments that enabled their formation.

 Bearing this in mind, for Dewey, the value in understanding the medical and social models of disability as related to the ideal and material aspects of culture is in understanding the cultural ground of disability as produced through the transformation of the human organism into a disabled person. Again, as Dewey states if “The problem is to find out the way in which the elements of a culture interact with each other and the way in which the elements of human nature are caused to interact with one another under conditions set by their interaction with the existing environment,”[[17]](#footnote-17) then the cultural problem of disability is to find out how disability as defined by the ideal elements of culture transaction with disability as defined by the material elements of culture such that disabled persons are a consummation of this transaction.

A Cultural Model of Disability

To say that disability and ability emerge through transaction with culture is to recognize how culture transforms the human organism into a disabled person through their transaction. On this view, disability is co-constituted through transaction with an environment that enables disability to emerge as a way of behaving, the meaning of an individual’s transactions with the environment. Again, this is not to ignore the biological as, for Dewey, the bodily organs are the means whereby any organism engages in transaction with the environment.[[18]](#footnote-18) Bearing this in mind, differences in biological organization of the human organism will result in different transactions with the cultural environment, and different ways in which the human organism will be organized into a person. How the body transacts with the cultural environment serves to structure that which we call disability. It is here that we might begin with the following statement from Dewey:

For man is social in another sense than the bee and ant, since his activities are encompassed in an environment that is culturally transmitted, so that what man does and how he acts, is determined not by organic structure and physical heredity alone but by the influence of cultural heredity, embedded in traditions, institutions, customs and the purposes and beliefs they both carry and inspire.[[19]](#footnote-19)

For Dewey, even the neurobiology of our brains is subject to modification through transaction with the environment. And, on this view, Custom makes use of the existing materiality of the body, as the “existing organs, impulses, instinctive tendencies, form the resources and the capital on which future development must build,”[[20]](#footnote-20) including the development of the human organism into a what we might consider an able-bodied person. To this end, a person is not so much originally suited to being a soldier, an athlete, a musician, or any other organization of the body as much as they become suited for such roles through the process of development through the environment. Nor, for Dewey, is a person born able-bodied or disabled: they become so through transformation and modification by culture. Thus, for Dewey, “The supposition that there is such a thing as a purely native original constitution of man which can be distinguished from everything acquired and learned cannot be justified by appeal to the facts. It is a view which holds good only when a static cross section is taken; when, that is to say, growth is ignored.”[[21]](#footnote-21)

 Here, then, is the value of Dewey and his transactional view of culture for disability: a transactional model rejects the assumption that there is a base or ground of human ability that can be appealed to as a means of marking disability as an abnormality. For Dewey, “The conception of a fixed and enumerable equipment of tendencies which constitutes human nature thus represents at the best but a convenient intellectual device, a bench mark useful for studying some particular period of development,”[[22]](#footnote-22) which is to say that we may only appeal to normality, or a normal human, as a point of a phase of development and, even then, doing so holds the organism statis in its development and ignores the ways in which the processes of transaction, of growth, is part of the “original equipment”[[23]](#footnote-23) of humanity and is that which enables the human organism to be transformed through transaction with the cultural environment. Thus, because the human organism is always in a proves of growth, pointing towards an ideal end of humanity is to proceed from a mistaken starting point. That is, the category of human is not fixed nor is it absolutely determined by its biological composition. Rather, it is an outcome of a process that develops differently depending on the cultural and social situation of the human organism. Further, one of the broad implications of this view is that the designation of the human is the designation of a range of ways of being human which may vary across time and transaction with different environments. To this end, there is no ideal human nature from which disabled persons are a deviant, rather, disability is part of a range of human possibilities which emerge through transaction with a social environment.

Where disability is concerned, we may find additional support for the above thesis through Susan Wendell who argues that the question of normality itself needs to be understood with reference to the environment in which the individual is in transaction. That is, in a Deweyan sense, inquiry into the normal grows out of a background of culture and subsequently modifies the conditions under which inquiry into the normal is performed. Normality and abnormality, for Dewey, are the results of a process of inquiry that transforms the material of the human organism. They are, on this view, the results of the transaction between the human organism and the environment and do not pre-exist either. Rather, as stated by Wendell:

the distinction between the biological reality of a disability and the social construction of a disability cannot be made sharply, because the biological and the social are interactive in creating disability. They are interactive not only in that complex interactions of social factors and our bodies affect health and functioning, but also in that social arrangements can make a biological condition more or less relevant to almost any situation.[[24]](#footnote-24)

If we read Wendall’s “interaction” as Dewey’s transaction, we can reunderstand the construction or deconstruction of disability as located within the transaction between the biological and the social such that disability is the transformation of the biological through the social, and the social is structured in transaction with the biological. Such a view therefore demands that we also recognize ability as a result of how the biological transacts with the social or is provided with a structured organization through the interaction of the ideal and material aspects of culture. As an example, the ways in which scientific explanations for disability are appealed to as justification for the reorganization of the built environment and the practices ongoing within them is an example of how the scientific, as part of the ideal order of culture, transacts with the material aspect of culture in the form of the built environment. In their interaction, culture is modified through the transactions with the disabled person to give rise to environments that are “accessible” through their reorganization.

There is, however, another way in which we might read Wendell’s transactional model of disability, and that is through Dewey’s concept of “fitness”[[25]](#footnote-25) as a reunderstanding of “ability.” For Dewey, judging the “fitness” of the human organism purely with reference to the human organism’s ability to survive in an environment absent cultural transformation is a mistake. It is not the case that those most able-bodied are those who are most fit to survive in an objective sense, specifically as the environments in which the human organism must survive have changed as a result of the development of culture. That is, for Dewey “The environment is now distinctly a social one, and the content of the term "fit" has to be made with reference to social adaptation,”[[26]](#footnote-26) which is to say that there can be no understanding of fitness or ability except with referent to how the individual transacts with a social environment. Fitness, like ability, is fitness within an environment which is adapted and adapts to the human organism and cannot be understood beyond it except insofar as the human organism can adapt to the new environment in which it is placed.

Further, fitness and ability are enabled by the cultural environment, the whole cultural environment. As Dewey states, fitness must be judged by the whole, and not simply with reference to a singular environmental condition. It is for this reason that part of fitness, for Dewey, consists in the flexibility of an organism to adapt to changing conditions. That is, fitness involves a dynamic relation to the environment such that the organism judged “fit” can quickly adapt to the environment. This is a point echoed by Rosemarie Garland-Thompson who articulates the opposite end of the spectrum, as the misfit. For Garland-Thompson, “the dynamism between body and world that produces fits or misfits comes at the spatial and temporal points of encounter between dynamic but relatively stable bodies and environments.”[[27]](#footnote-27) Put another way, “fit” and “misfit” are not essentially static properties of organisms, they emerge from the ways in which the organism transacts flexibly with its environment; in terms of disability, it is how one transacts with the cultural environment that enables or disables an individual.

Thus, to take a Deweyan approach, disability emerges in transaction with and by means of an environment. Disability itself and the ways in which disabled people are identified as such is a social practice, one which is structured around power dynamics and inequalities in society.[[28]](#footnote-28) As a social practice, defining disability belongs to the order of ideal elements in culture that, in transaction with the material aspects of culture, result in Wendell’s cultural construction of disability. For Wendall, “the social response to and treatment of biological difference constructs disability from biological reality, determining both the nature and the severity of disability.”[[29]](#footnote-29) As indicated in the previous section, the social practice of defining disability emerges from the transactions between the material aspects of culture and the ideal aspects of culture, insofar as the interrelation between the two orders, operative in the medicalization of disability and the treatment of disability as something to be fixed as two examples, results in the organization of disabled persons from the raw materials of the biological reality of their bodies. To this end, it is not simply the case for either Dewey or Wendell that merely changing the organization of society would mitigate the ways in which individuals transact with the environment through their disabled bodies. Indeed, as Wendall notes, our very relationships with our bodies may not be dependent upon the organization of society and thus meliorated by reorganization of merely the material elements of culture: we must also attend to the ideal.

Thus, the “cultural problem” of disability is the ways in which the ideal elements of culture and the material elements of culture transact with one another under cultural conditions that give rise to disability as deviation from a *fictional* norm that, itself, emerges through transactions with the environment. That is, for Dewey, the cultural problem of disability is not just the presumption of an inherent capacity of the human organism, an inherent organization of the human organism, that precedes its reorganization through transaction with culture; it is the denial that disability and neurodiversity can contribute meaningfully to the existing body of habits that make up culture. This is to say that even the processes of diagnosis, of inquiring into how our embodiment functions, is performed against a cultural background that selects, in advance, the moral worth of its results. Despite this, however, the “cultural problem” of disability opens new possibilities for disability activism, namely through supplying an answer to the question: is there a such thing as disability culture.

Disability Culture

To conclude, I want to introduce a preliminary sketch of the possibilities that emerge when we consider disability as a cultural problem through Dewey. While the above has framed the “problem” of disability as located in the interaction between the ideal elements of culture and the material elements of culture, the above also opens up the possibility for the conservation of disability as a unique way of being in the world through the identification of the culture of disability. Again, for Dewey, culture is a specific pattern of behavior that enables transaction with an environment through the unique embodiment of its members. As such, culture transforms both the human organism into a person, and the physical environment into one of meaning and value through the interrelation of the ideal and material elements of culture. Disability culture, therefore, are the ways that disabled persons transform their physical environments, or the cultural environments into which they emerge, through the unique patterns of behavior, habits, that enable them to have a world of meaning and value.

For example, to speak of Deaf culture is not simply to speak of the ways in which signing allows for the articulation of experience and unique forms of transaction with the world, it is to speak of the ways in which deaf persons, through the habits that emerge from their unique embodiments transform the worlds into which they are born such that whole new ways of meaning and transaction emerge. While sign language is the clearest example of these new modes of transaction, I would point to the Deaflympic Games as an example of the ways in which the habits that proceed from disabled bodies transform the environment such that new customs, new ways of being in the world emerge. To be clear, I am not simply speaking of the modifications made to the sporting events within the Deaflympic Games, but to the ways that the habits of the audience are also modified. Rather than cheer or clap during competitions, spectators often wave or engage in other, non-verbal expressions of support within the context of the sporting event. To this end, a eugenicist argument that we should eliminate deafness cannot simply be judged as the elimination of a specific “abnormality;” rather, it should be judged as the elimination of a mode of transacting with the world through the body that opens new possibilities for being in the world.

 While “parasports” might be a visible example of disabled culture, we must recall that culture is a collection of habits that enables transaction with and transformation of the world into an environment of meaning and value. Disabled culture, therefore, may also include Autistic masking and camouflaging as habits developed to enable transaction with a culture that itself does not have appropriate habits to transact with Autistic persons. Here, I am drawing upon Radulski’s distinction between masking and camouflaging where camouflaging is the assimilation to neurotypical norms through approximating the habits of neurotypical social transaction. In contrast, masking is the attempt to conceal external Autistic traits through one’s internal recognition of said traits. In both contexts, it is through transaction with a social environment that the habits of masking and camouflaging are developed to enable the Autistic person to navigate a space through a specific mode of social adaptation. To be clear, I am not suggesting that Autistic masking and camouflaging should be *necessary*; indeed we should strive for a culture that has customs of transaction that do not rely on neurotypicality. Rather, I am suggesting that their presence, and the experiences that they shape, indicates an Autistic culture with its own unique ways of transacting with the world which are shared among Autistic individuals such that the world becomes more meaningful. More negatively, I am suggesting that the *presence* of habits like Autistic masking and camouflaging point to the ways in which the “cultural problem” of disability is in the failure of our culture to develop appropriate habits of transaction with disabled persons, rather than seek our destruction.

 While this understanding of disability culture is incomplete, the failure to recognize disability culture as culture, in my view, contributes to the persistence of the cultural problem of disability. That many of the elements of disability culture as habits exists as adaptations to a hostile environment, rather than as unique ways of organizing spaces of meaning and value, points to the ways that existing social spaces, existing cultures, refuse to view disability and disabled persons, as anything more than a problem to be resolved.

1. Dewey, *Freedom and Culture*, 75, 77 [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. ibid, 77 [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. ibid, 75 [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Dewey, *Unmodern Philosophy and Modern Philosophy,* 187 [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. ibid*,* 187 [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Dewey, *Freedom and Culture*, 76 [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Dewey, *Art as Experience*, 19 [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. ibid, 62 [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. Dewey, *Unmodern Philosophy and Modern Philosophy* 189-90 [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. Ibid, 190 [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct*, 45 [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. ibid, 363 [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. ibid, 362 [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. Alexander, *Art Experience and Nature* 160 [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. Dewey, *Experience and Nature*, 363 [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. Dewey, *Democracy and Education*, 20 [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. Dewey, *Freedom and Culture*, 76 [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. Dewey, *Art as Experience,* 19 [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. Dewey, *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry,* 49 [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. Dewey, *Human Nature,* 32 [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. Ibid, 31 [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. Ibid, 32 [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. Ibid, 31 [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. Wendell, *The Rejected Body,* 35 [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. Dewey, *Evolution and Ethics*, 41 [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. ibid, 41 [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. Garland-Thompson 2014, n.p. [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. Wendall, *The Rejected Body*, 23 Also, Tremain 2012 provides an excellent overview of disability and power in *Foucault and Feminist Philosophy of Disability* [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
29. Wendall, *The Rejected Body,* 23 [↑](#footnote-ref-29)